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I. Introduction 
No character in a Socratic dialogue is as boring as a yes-man. 
It is with regret, then, that I confess to general agreement with 
Professor Calhoun’s address. Although I cannot repay my 
invitation to write this response by challenging Calhoun, however, 
I believe I can do so by approaching the subject of his address from 
a different angle.  
Although Professor Calhoun and I are both Christians, 
Calhoun’s talk was structured so as to be of roughly equal 
relevance to any religious tradition. At the same time, Calhoun’s 
survey of history was focused solely on the United States, and 
therefore on the political controversies of the last few centuries. To 
complement Calhoun’s address, I propose to narrow the scope of 
the discussion to Christianity and, in addition, broaden it to 
encompass two millennia of church-state relations and first 
principles of political morality.  
                                                                                                     
* J.D., 2018, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Huyett was the 2018 
President of Washington and Lee’s chapter of the Christian Legal Society. His 
paper “‘As I Had Mercy on You’: Karla Faye Tucker, Immanuel Kant, and the 
Impossibility of Christian Retributivism” was published in the Summer 2018 
issue of Religio et Lex. 
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I approach the topic this way for two reasons: first, because I 
see the universal Christian church as a single body extended 
through time, and, second, because Christianity is a worldview 
which speaks to every area of human existence. Christians believe 
that Christ established a kingdom which “shall never be 
destroyed . . . it shall stand forever.”1 Likewise, all of human life 
must be centered upon God, for “from him and through him and to 
him are all things.”2 I am therefore concerned with the questions 
of what influence the church has had on public policy over the 
course of its whole existence—and whether any competing set of 
principles can hope to challenge Christian belief.  
One of the most compelling themes of Professor Calhoun’s 
address was that a religiously informed political philosophy can, 
and should be, appealing on its face. Does the application of 
religion to politics, Calhoun asked the audience, “enrich our 
democracy or harm it?”3 Through his historical examples—which 
focused on the evangelical roots of abolitionism—Calhoun showed 
that a comprehensive Christian ethic is not only rational, but 
desirable. For instance, Calhoun asked the audience whether New 
England clergy should have refrained from condemning the 
expansion of slavery as a great moral wrong.4 
Calhoun’s question suggests two arguments. First, it would be 
illogical for Christians to believe that slavery is a sin but remain 
silent about its practice—or to conceal their religious motives in 
opposing it. Second, unless one supports slavery, then it would be 
odd to suggest that William Wilberforce should have preferred to 
remain quiet rather than root his abolitionism in his Christian 
faith.5 I will underscore Calhoun’s point by showing that, for 
                                                                                                     
 1. Daniel 2:44. 
 2. Romans 11:36. 
 3. Samuel W. Calhoun, Separation of Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln, 
and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended to 
Separate Religion from Politics, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 459, 488 (2018). 
4. Id. at 488  
 5. William Wilberforce was a prominent and successful evangelical 
abolitionist in Britain. See History: William Wilberforce (1759–1833), BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/wilberforce_william.shtml (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2018) (“Wilberforce was a deeply religious English member of 
parliament and social reformer who was very influential in the abolition of the 
slave trade and eventually slavery itself in the British empire.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
548 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 546 (2018) 
thousands of years, Christians have advanced human liberty 
through the explicit application of their faith to politics and law. A 
handful of examples, taken from various eras of church history, 
will illustrate my point. 
 
II.  Religion and Politics Throughout History 
In 390 AD, during the 
Christian era of the Roman 
Empire, the Emperor Theodosius 
responded to an uprising in 
Thessalonica by rashly ordering a 
massacre of the population.6 
“Multitudes were mowed down 
like ears of grain in harvest-tide,” 
wrote the historian Theodoret; “It 
is said that seven thousand 
perished.”7 At the time, Aurelius 
“Ambrose” Ambrosius, Archbishop 
of Milan—known today as the 
mentor of Augustine—was the 
most prominent leader of the 
church.8 When Theodosius went 
to the cathedral at Milan to receive communion, Ambrose 
protested the massacre by personally blocking the emperor from 
entering9—an event that has been powerfully illustrated by 
Anthony van Dyck.10 
Ambrose was driven by his belief in the sovereignty of God—
and the dependence and fallenness of all human beings. Though 
Theodosius was wearing purple robes, Ambrose reasoned, his 
                                                                                                     
 6. Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History (Book V) 5.17, NEW ADVENT, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/27025.htm (last visited on Aug. 23, 2018) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. Id. at 5.17. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Anthony van Dyck, Saint Ambrose barring Theodosius from Milan 
Cathedral (1619–1620). 
Saint Ambrose barring Theodosius from 
Milan Cathedral, A. van Dyck, 1619–1620 
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clothes adorned a body made of dust.11 “You are a sovereign, Sir, 
of men of like nature with your own, and who are in truth your 
fellow slaves,” argued Ambrose, “for there is one Lord and 
Sovereign of mankind, Creator of the Universe.”12 At Christmas, 
Theodosius again attempted to enter the cathedral—this time at 
the urging of his chief of staff, Rufinus. In response, Ambrose 
denounced both men to their faces, telling Rufinus that “your 
impudence matches a dog’s” and calling Theodosius a “tyrant.”13 
“You are raging against God,” he told Theodosius, “you are 
trampling on his laws.”14 In order to gain admittance, Theodosius 
was forced to declare a suspension of capital punishment for thirty 
days and to prostrate himself on the ground.15 Using the words of 
King David, Theodosius prayed “[m]y soul cleaves unto the dust, 
quicken thou me according to your word.”16  
The paradox behind the Emperor’s prayer—that a man might 
rule the world and yet be a penitent vassal—was a notion 
unparalleled in imperial history. The idea of the supreme emperor 
had survived the unchecked depravities and massacres of Caligula, 
Caracalla, and Diocletian. It must have been wondrous to behold 
an Emperor bowed by the mere spiritual authority of a bishop—a 
man who cannot have been armed with anything more than a 
crosier and a choir. Even so, Ambrose wrote of the incident that “I 
have preferred to be somewhat wanting in duty rather than in 
humility”17—suggesting that, if he had been a more dutiful 
Christian, he would have been even more zealous in his defiance. 
This otherworldly fury and force is exactly what we would expect 
to see if Christianity is true: a suggestion that, in the church, God 
had ignited a singular fire in the midst of human affairs. 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Ecclesiastical History, supra note 6, at 5.17 (“We must not because 
we are dazzled by the sheen of the purple fail to see the weakness of the body that 
it robes.”). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; Cf. Psalm 119:25.  
 17. Ambrose, Epistles 51, NEW ADVENT, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/340951.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
550 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 546 (2018) 
As if answering Professor Calhoun’s address directly, Ambrose 
explained his actions in a letter. Having heard of the massacre, he 
could not “close [his] ears with wax.”18 “Should I keep silence?,” 
Ambrose asked.19 “But then my conscience would be bound, my 
utterance taken away, which would be the most wretched condition 
of all.”20 Ambrose then cited Ezekiel 3:18, which reads “If I [God] 
say to the wicked, ‘You shall surely die,’ and you give him no 
warning . . . that wicked person shall die for his iniquity, but his 
blood I will require at your hand.”21 
Although the Roman Empire eventually fell, the church—and 
its power to subdue oppressive rulers—did not. In G.K. 
Chesterton’s words, once the ship of Europe had sunk, it soon 
“came up again: repainted and glittering, with the cross still at the 
top.”22 Nor did Christian political influence remain limited to 
rulers as conscientious as Theodosius.  
Even the Frankish Queen Fredegund—known for 
assassinating several of her own family members and trying to 
murder her daughter with her bare hands23—was susceptible to its 
power. In 580 AD, Fredegund’s sons fell ill and died.24 Believing 
that God was punishing her for her cruelty, Fredegund gathered 
up and burned the registers she had used to assess crippling taxes 
against the poor.25 According to historian Paul Freedman, the 
Frankish royals believed that “the poor, the widow, the orphans—
the people that they have oppressed—have a kind of power of 
vengeance by mobilizing this supernatural force.”26 Fredegund 
then convinced her husband, Chilperic, that God would give them 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Ezekiel 3:18. 
 22. G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 212–213 (Catholic Answers ed. 2014) 
(1908).  
 23.  JANA K. SCHULMAN, THE RISE OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 500–1300: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 146 (2002). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Paul Freedman, Lecture 11—Frankish Society, YALE U., 
https://oyc.yale.edu/history/hist-210/lecture-11 (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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a new son if he stopped assessing new taxes.27 Chilperic complied, 
and Fredegund gave birth to a future king, Clothar the Great.28 
Fredegund’s repentance differs from the Emperor’s not only 
because of her greater fondness for killing, but because—so far as 
I know—Fredegund did not have an Ambrose to correct her. In the 
darkness of Fredegund’s tragedy, Christianity itself may have 
stood as her strange and surprising conscience—speaking for the 
voiceless even without a living voice to proclaim it. Certainly, there 
are countless verses in the Bible that may have moved her—too 
many to list them all here. Yet it is hard not to imagine that 
Fredegund had in mind the words of the prophet Amos: “Therefore 
because you trample on the poor and you exact taxes of grain from 
him, you have built houses of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell 
in them; you have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not 
drink their wine.”29 
We can see that the 
church’s power influenced a 
wide range of rulers. Perhaps 
no medieval Christian ruler 
has commanded so much 
attention as Charlemagne. 
Crowned Holy Roman Emperor 
in 800 AD, Charlemagne 
single-handedly created a 
superstate that promised to 
reunify Europe—an 
achievement that would not be 
rivaled until Napoleon’s 
conquests one thousand years 
later. Like Theodosius before 
him, Charlemagne was capable 
of both thoughtful 
introspection and rash 
violence. On the one hand, 
Charlemagne favored decentralized power, promoted education, 
and encouraged care for the poor. On the other hand, he sometimes 
                                                                                                     
 27. SCHULMAN, supra note 23, at 146. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Amos 5:11. 
Stained glass window depicting the 
friendship of Charlemagne and Alcuin, 
Lafayette College. 
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fell short of his own ethics—as when he forced the pagan Saxons 
to convert at the point of a sword.30 When this happened, however, 
the church—once again—was ready to admonish and restrain the 
coercive use of governmental authority.31 Alcuin, the foremost 
Christian thinker of his age and a close associate of Charlemagne, 
demanded an end to forced conversions. “Faith arises from the will, 
not from compulsion,” he wrote.32 “You can persuade a man to 
believe, but you cannot force him. You may even be able to force 
him to be baptized, but this will not help to instill the faith within 
him.”33 
The powerful example of Ambrose illuminated even the High 
Middle Ages. In 1075, one of Charlemagne’s successors—the Holy 
Roman Emperor Henry IV—resisted a push to end government 
control of internal church appointments.34 Pope Gregory VII 
responded by excommunicating Henry IV in 1076.35 In defending 
the excommunication, Gregory cited Ezekiel 3:18—the same verse 
cited by Ambrose almost 700 years earlier.36 This 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Thomas Shahan & Ewan Macpherson, Charlemagne, NEW ADVENT, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03610c.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) 
(“Education, for aspirants to the priesthood at least, was furthered by the royal 
order of 787 to all bishops and abbots to keep open in their cathedrals and 
monasteries schools for the study of the seven liberal arts and the interpretation 
of Scriptures.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. See id. (“At any rate, the ‘Saxon Capitulary’ . . . of 781 obliged all Saxons 
not only to accept baptism (and this on the pain of death) . . . .”). 
 32. Alcuin: “Epistles 110, 113” on Faith by Will, Not Compulsion (765 CE), 
GEO. U. BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS, 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/quotes/alcuin-epistles-110-113-on-faith-by-
will-not-compulsion-765-ce (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Conflict of Investitures, NEW ADVENT, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08084c.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) 
(“Ignoring the prohibition of Gregory, as also the latter’s effort at a mitigation of 
the same, Henry continued to appoint bishops in Germany and in Italy.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35. See Klemens Löffler, Conflict of Investitures, NEW ADVENT, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08084c.htm (“At the next Lenten Synod in 
Rome (1076) Gregory sat in judgment upon the king, and in a prayer to Peter, 
Prince of the Apostles, declared: ‘I depose him from the government of the whole 
Kingdom of Germany and Italy, release all Christians from their oath of 
allegiance, forbid him to be obeyed as king . . . and as thy successor bind him with 
the fetters of anathema.’”)  
 36. EPHRAIM EMERTON, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF POPE GREGORY VII: 
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excommunication proved so debilitating that, in the famous “Road 
to Canossa” incident, Henry IV personally traveled to Italy to beg 
Gregory’s forgiveness, accompanied by only a few bodyguards.37 In 
a gesture that should seem familiar, Henry waited outside the 
fortress at Canossa, barefoot and dressed in sackcloth, for three 
days. Gregory, satisfied with his repentance, invited Henry inside 
and received him back into the church.38 
From the standpoint of our age, when it is often believed that 
separating church and state means separating religion and 
politics, the story of Canossa is particularly ironic. It was precisely 
Gregory’s Christian conception of politics that motivated him to 
protect the church from state interference—and, in doing so, serve 
as the state’s conscience.  
From these examples, we can see that many of the of church’s 
humane achievements now stand unacknowledged. Likewise, the 
church opposed many of the abuses that are now usually 
misattributed to it. The Spanish conquest of the Americas, for 
example, is often thought to have been driven as much by 
evangelical fervor as by greed. In reality, it was church leaders—
especially the Dominicans—who were the foremost critics of 
Spanish atrocities against American Indians.39  
In 1550, the Dominican reformer Bartolomé de las Casas 
successfully persuaded the Holy Roman Emperor to put his 
conquests on hold pending the outcome of a theological debate in 
                                                                                                     
SELECTED LETTERS FROM THE REGISTRUM 101 (1932). 
 37.  Conflict of Investitures, NEW ADVENT, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08084c.htm 
He was finally admitted to the papal presence, and pledged himself to 
recognize the mediation and decision of the pope in the quarrel with 
the princes, and was then freed from excommunication (January, 
1077). This famous event has been countless times described, and from 
very divergent points of view. Through Bismarck, Canossa became a 
proverbial term to indicate the humiliation of the civil power before the 
ambitious and masterful Church. 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38. PATRICK J. GEARY, READINGS IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY 572 (4th ed. 1974). 
 39. Paolo G. Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin 
American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 281, 290 
(2003), https://www.umass.edu/legal/Benavides/Fall2005/397U/ 
Readings%20Legal%20397U/4%20Paolo%20Carozza.pdf (“At the time, the 
foremost critics of Spanish brutality in the Indies were the friars of the Order of 
Preachers (also known as Dominicans, after their founder St. Dominic.)”). 
554 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 546 (2018) 
the Council of the Indies.40 The historian Lewis Hanke writes that 
“[p]robably never before or since has a mighty emperor . . . ordered 
his conquests to cease until it was decided if they were just.”41 
Casas’ example is so striking, in fact, that some have attempted to 
detach him from church history and reimagine him as a secular 
Enlightenment thinker. Although Casas believed himself to be 
propounding the traditional Christian position, the argument goes, 
he was in fact preempting Rousseau.42 This position demonstrates 
a dismissive ignorance of the church history already discussed. In 
appealing to Christianity to oppose imperialism, Casas was 
walking a millennia-old path already trodden—in the classical and 
middle ages—by Ambrose and Alcuin. It is far less likely that 
Casas was a closet secularist than that he was influenced by a 
savior who said “I came to cast fire on the earth, and would that it 
were already kindled.”43 
As Professor Calhoun has 
already discussed the role of 
Christianity in the abolitionist 
movement, I will conclude my 
list with a contemporary 
example. In 2014, Congress 
established the bipartisan 
Charles Colson Task Force on 
Federal Corrections,44 which 
recommended, among other 
things, increasing the safety of 
American prisons in order to 
promote rehabilitation.45 The 
name of the task force was 
fitting, as Charles Colson, until 
                                                                                                     
 40. DAVID KEANE, CASTE-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 82–83 (2007). 
 41. Id. at 80. 
 42. Id. at 83–84. 
 43. Luke 12:49. 
 44. Steve Rempe, A Proposal for Change, PRISON FELLOWSHIP, 
https://www.prisonfellowship.org/2016/01/charles-colson-task-force-on-federal-
corrections/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 45. Id. 
Charles Colson ministering to prisoners 
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his death in 2012, was one of America’s foremost Christian leaders 
as well as its most effective advocate for criminal justice reform. 
Colson, whose championing of liberty was not limited to prisons, 
put the historic Christian position well: “it is crucial that the 
church be engaged politically—not to exercise power but to protect 
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.”46  
Having surveyed church history, I will now respond to one of 
the most common accusations currently heard against 
Christianity’s historic influence on public policy. The argument, 
often associated with Nietzsche and other secular elements of the 
political right, is that Christian morality—with its transcendent 
valuation of human dignity—in fact gave rise to the most naïve 
excesses of the Enlightenment, and so led to the bloody 
totalitarianism of the 20th century. That this is nearly the opposite 
of the argument made by secular devotees of Casas is 
unsurprising: as Chesterton once observed, it has often seemed as 
if “any stick was good enough to beat Christianity with.”47 
The Nietzschean narrative has become so common that I have 
even heard some Christians grudgingly acknowledge, as an 
unpleasant fact beyond dispute, that Marxism is an illegitimate 
child of the Christian faith. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. In the first place, one should note that each of the historical 
examples discussed above amounted to a restraint on 
governmental power, not an assertion of it. More fundamentally, 
however, Christianity—unlike Marxism—has never known a 
concept of equality as good in and of itself.48  
Helping others is, of course, central to the Christian life—“as 
you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to 
me.”49 Yet this duty to care for others in no way suggests that 
uniformity of position or role is desirable. Chesterton, as usual, put 
the matter most succinctly: 
That all men should live in equally beautiful houses is a dream 
that may or may not be attained. But that all men should live 
in the same beautiful house is not a dream at all; it is a 
nightmare. That a man should love all old women is an ideal 
                                                                                                     
 46. CHARLES COLSON, THE SKY IS NOT FALLING 191 (2011). 
 47. CHESTERTON, supra note 22, at 122–23. 
 48. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 49. Matthew 25:45. 
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that may not be attainable. But that a man should regard all 
old women exactly as he regards his mother is not only an 
unattainable ideal, but an ideal which ought not to be 
attained.50 
Far from prizing egalitarianism in the modern, Marxist sense, 
Christianity upholds variety of position and role as a thing of 
intrinsic value. Paul writes that “there is one body, but it has many 
parts . . . If the whole body were an eye, how could it hear? If the 
whole body were an ear, how could it smell?”51 It is variety that 
gives rise to the beauty of complementarity, and so it is variety—
and not the deadening sameness of totalitarianism—that reflects 
the nature of a fundamentally relational God. The New Testament 
makes this apparent in, among other areas, its picture of marriage: 
“For the husband is the head of the wife even as Christ is the head 
of the church, his body, and is himself its savior . . . Husbands, love 
your wives as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for 
her.”52 In this way, the complementarity of the Christian social 
order models the interpersonal aspect of God.  
 The Nietzschean 
argument also reflects an 
ignorance of totalitarianism’s 
development. Historically, 
totalitarianism emerged less 
as a distortion of Christianity 
than as a conscious inversion 
of it. As a definite ideology, 
Western totalitarianism was 
not conceived until the 
Renaissance. It was then 
carried to term by thinkers 
like Thomas Hobbes, who—
at the same time—began to 
conspicuously shuffle God 
out of political philosophy. 
Once its gestation was complete, totalitarian power burst suddenly 
onto the plane of history, fully formed, in the guise of the 
                                                                                                     
 50. CHESTERTON, supra note 22, at 174. 
 51. 1 Corinthians 12:12-17. 
 52. Ephesians 5:23-25. 
The Jacobins drowned thousands of Christian 
men and women in the Loire. Jean-Baptiste 
Carrier, who oversaw the executions, said “Never 
have I had so much amusement as in seeing the 
last grimaces of priests as they die.” 
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Jacobins—who quickly repaid their supposed debt to Christianity 
by publicly drowning clergy in the Loire.53  
This timing is not a coincidence. If the Christian church had 
been capable of producing totalitarianism under its own power, it 
had over a thousand years to do so. As soon as the literati of Europe 
had rejected classical and medieval Christianity, however, the 
omnipotent state was elevated to the status of a quasi-Christ—or, 
from the Christian perspective, an anti-Christ. In Chesterton’s 
words, “once abolish the God, and the government becomes the 
God.”54 
III. Religious and Secular Political Morality 
Thus far, I have argued that Christianity has had a broadly 
constructive influence on Western politics and, additionally, has 
not been harmful in some of the ways commonly alleged. Reaching 
still further back to first principles of political morality, I will now 
go on the offensive against those who would urge that “religion has 
no place in politics,” as if this were a neutral axiom of all civilized 
society.55 I will argue that this maxim is either incoherent, or else 
it is an expression of arbitrary bias against religion. 
                                                                                                     
 53. Thomas Woods, Episode 12—The Anti-Catholic Atrocities that History 
Forgot, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: BUILDER OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bILhhHCK-4 (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
Note that, while Woods’ lecture is a good introduction to the Drownings at Nantes, 
its title is somewhat misleading. These state-sanctioned murders were part of a 
French campaign to exterminate Christianity in general—known as 
“dechristianization”—that ultimately led to the creation of an atheistic “Cult of 
Reason.” La fête de l'Être suprême (1794), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AGE OF POLITICAL 
REVOLUTIONS AND NEW IDEOLOGIES 1760–1815 237 (2007). 
 54. G. K. CHESTERTON, CHRISTENDOM IN DUBLIN Ch. III (1932). 
 55. See, e.g., Teresa Wiltz, “Oh Lord, Can’t We Keep Religion Out of Politics?”, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2013, 12:43 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/keep-religion-out-
politics (“Religion has no place in politics—and it certainly has no place in the US 
supreme court. Religion, or the lack thereof, is such a deeply, deeply personal 
thing.”); Cf. Barack Obama, Obama’s 2006 Speech on Faith and Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech.html (last visited July 22, 2018) 
(“[S]ecularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the 
door before entering into the public square.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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First, consider an example I gave during the panel discussion 
following Professor Calhoun’s talk. I favor a government of strictly 
limited powers, in part, because I believe in the Christian doctrine 
of Original Sin. Because human beings are predisposed to evil, 
political power will inevitably be abused, and should be 
restricted.56 If one insists, in response, that “religion has no place 
in politics,” what exactly would this mean? 
One possible interpretation might be simply that, whether or 
not I am warranted in believing in Original Sin, I should not derive 
a political conclusion from a religious belief. The first problem with 
this assertion, of course, is that it would be nonsense. It is not 
logically possible to sincerely hold a belief while mentally 
cordoning it off from the rest of one’s mind. Doing so would be like 
believing yourself to be a skilled public speaker, but not concluding 
that you are actually capable of giving an effective speech. This 
makes the statement that “religion has no place in politics” a 
meaningless cacophony of words. If it expresses anything at all, it 
is a demand that religious people adopt a sort of compulsory 
schizophrenia.  
The second problem with this assertion is that it suggests that 
some beliefs, although warranted, must never be the basis of any 
practical conclusions. The absurdity of this suggestion is, if 
possible, even more obvious. No one would assert that a warranted 
belief that immunotherapy will cure cancer, that one’s beverage is 
poisoned, or that a bridge on the road ahead has collapsed, cannot 
be the basis of any practical change in behavior. Mental 
separationism, as we have interpreted it, therefore appears to 
inexplicably quarantine some warranted beliefs—especially those 
concerning the origin of the universe and human existence, their 
purpose and destiny, and our essential condition—as “religious” 
and therefore disfavored.  
This brings us to a second possible interpretation: that mental 
separationism is simply an assertion that all religious beliefs are 
false; in other words, an assertion of atheism or agnosticism. In 
one sense, of course, it is logical for any atheist to support this kind 
of separationism. I myself hold an equivalent position: I believe 
that atheism is a false belief, that false beliefs should not inform 
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public policy, and that atheism should therefore not inform public 
policy. Any atheist would argue that religion should not inform 
public policy for the same reasons. In a more important sense, 
however, this interpretation makes all modern talk of a “wall of 
separation” an extravagant dishonesty.57 It would be bizarre to 
present my belief that atheism is false as a mutual “wall of 
separation” between atheism and the state—when, in fact, I wish 
to detach atheism from politics for the very reason that I think 
nobody should be an atheist in the first place.  
Insofar as this interpretation is what separationists actually 
mean, then phrases like “religion has no place in politics” are 
nothing more than devices to willfully obscure their true position—
and they should be identified as such.58 Theists are happy to assert 
our own position straightforwardly; we resist atheistic arguments 
in politics because we have concluded that atheism is not true. If 
atheists are to discourse with religious believers, then they should 
adopt the same candor—and should not attempt to frontload the 
discussion with tricks. 
Whatever they mean, 
seperationists clearly do not 
assert that no moral premises 
can inform politics. As 
Professor Calhoun noted, 
then-Senator Obama made 
this point well in 2006: “To 
say that men and women 
should not inject their 
‘personal morality’ into public 
policy debates is a practical 
absurdity. Our law is by 
definition a codification of morality. . . .”59 Anyone who publicly 
advocates laws against murder, in other words, is assuming some 
approximation of the moral belief that murder is wrong. 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 465 (discussing the “wall of separation” 
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 58. Wiltz, supra note 55.  
 59. Barack Obama, Obama’s 2006 Speech on Faith and Politics, N.Y. TIMES 
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Secularists who seek to categorically exclude religious 
premises from politics, then, are asserting that, when they use 
moral premises to promote certain policies, these premises stand 
on stronger ground than religious ones. Although there is not space 
here for a comprehensive apologetic for Christian morality, I will 
conclude this response by arguing that secularists are no more 
justified in using their own moral premises in policy arguments 
than are religious believers. No secular account of political 
morality—neither a quasi-morality of personal taste, nor a 
Platonic belief in nontheistic moral realism—can provide premises 
which are more tenable than theistic ones. This means that mental 
separationism expresses, not only a bias against religious belief, 
but an arbitrary bias.  
Of course, it is conceivable to punish murderers and other 
criminals, for example, without any coherent justification at all. 
One could act in the world while remaining silent, or simply refuse 
to provide a justification—perhaps by announcing that you are 
doing the things you want to do. This was essentially the course 
chosen by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a nihilist who rejected 
the existence of moral values and duties.  
Although Justice Holmes might seem to have expressed moral 
positions, he clearly explained that these were actually nothing 
more than expressions of his personal taste. “I can’t help preferring 
port to ditch-water, but I see no grounds for supposing that the 
cosmos shares my weakness,” he said.60  Holmes equated moral 
problems with the question “Do you like sugar in your coffee or 
don’t you? . . . So as to truth.”61  Or, more explicitly:  
The world has produced the rattlesnake as well as me; but I kill 
it if I get the chance, as also mosquitos, cockroaches, murderers, 
and flies. My only judgment is that they are incongruous with 
the world I want; the kind of world we all try to make according 
to our power. 62 
Holmes was quite willing to grant that he had no justification 
for executing a murderer. The murderer’s preference for murder 
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really carries no less authority than Holmes’ own preference for 
killing him—except that people with these two preferences 
sometimes differ in raw power. If murderers were to become 
judges, then non-murderers could be executed with the same 
authority.  
While either kind of execution is possible, neither Holmes nor 
a pro-murder judge would have any basis for using his personal 
tastes as a premise in a public policy argument. A robber may well 
feel that he is justified in robbing others at gunpoint by the fact 
that he wants to do so. But—as the robber impliedly recognizes by 
brandishing a weapon—this fact can no more support a conclusion 
about what other people ought to do than can the hooting of an 
orangutan. 
 Nihilists in the vein of Justice Holmes often argue that many 
persons share certain broad, primary tastes, and that most moral 
reasoning can be replaced with discussions about how best we 
might jointly realize these primary tastes. To illustrate this idea, 
we might picture an imaginary congress of humanity, at which 
someone proposes a motion: “Whereas all of us wish not to be 
murdered or raped, be it resolved that none of us shall murder or 
rape.” Putting the glaring impracticality of this nebulous concept 
to one side,63 a nihilist’s quasi-moral reasoning would be almost as 
                                                                                                     
 63. The most obvious practical difficulty with this concept is that it will do 
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politically useless as it is transparently unsatisfying. A friendly 
nihilist might at least have some persuasive authority when his 
primary tastes are shared by others. But if his countrymen began 
to acquire a primary taste for a fatherland populated by 
pureblooded Aryans, for example, he could only express 
frustration. The kindly nihilist’s best argument would sound 
something like: “But my tastes are the tastes that I have.”  
To take a more specific example, suppose Justice Holmes’ own 
preference for a eugenically pure society, free of “imbeciles,” was 
akin to his preference for drinking wine rather than ditch-water.64 
In this case, no one could persuade him to abandon it without first 
persuading him to abandon nihilism. A eugenicist holds incorrect 
moral premises which must be replaced. Yet a nihilist’s deepest 
premises cannot be replaced by any kind of argument, since he 
views all moral premises the way he views his taste for black 
coffee. The nihilist’s imagined social contract, then, cannot even be 
the basis for a quasi-philosophy of ethics that is of any lasting use 
in public policy discussions.  
Although Holmes’ nihilism 
is common among lay atheists, it 
is rare among their academic 
counterparts. One alternative to 
nihilism is found in Plato’s 
Forms, which are said to exist 
objectively—that is, they are not 
mere preferences—but are 
decidedly not anchored in a 
personal God. In the modern 
United States, students and 
academics in philosophy 
departments commonly adopt a 
similar, Marxist account of 
nontheistic moral realism. 
Although it is rare for modern 
philosophers to actually use the 
term “Forms” to describe moral 
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duties, a Marxist sees these duties as transcending human 
preferences while also having a non-personal source. The idea of a 
Platonic Form is both the best and the only conceivable way to 
describe this source.65 
In the first place, we should note that the modern 
philosopher’s rejection of God now carries with it a curious 
arbitrariness. Modern proponents of the Forms deny God’s 
existence—presumably because they feel there is insufficient 
evidence that God exists—yet have no trouble believing that our 
moral duties come from an invisible metaphysical cloud. It has now 
become so common for philosophers to be both atheists and moral 
realists that Christian philosophers rarely criticize their secular 
colleagues for this apparent hypocrisy—perhaps because atheistic 
Platonism had acquired an “Emperor’s new clothes” aura of 
academic respectability. 
The arbitrariness of Platonic atheism poses further problems. 
First, even if the Forms existed, there is no reason to think that 
humans could correctly perceive them. The Christian philosopher 
Alvin Plantinga has noted that, if our brains have come into being 
without God or anything like him, then we have very little reason 
to think that we have correct beliefs.66 For any given situation, 
thousands of false belief-desire combinations might move our body 
parts in the ways required for us to survive and reproduce. In fact, 
if humans have no transcendent minds, then our consciousness is 
merely a side-effect of the machinery of our brains: our beliefs may 
be irrelevant to our actions and not adaptive at all. 
Again, even supposing we could perceive impersonal Forms, 
why is it that these abstractions happen to correspond to human 
beings? Without some kind of theism, it is an accident that humans 
exist at all. We are, as the philosopher Democritus thought, 
collocations of atoms in a void. It would be suspiciously convenient 
if transcendent Forms were waiting all along to provide moral 
duties to accidental collections of particles. For the theist, this 
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problem vanishes: God-ordained duties correspond to us because 
God created us. In the words of Yale law professor and nihilist 
Arthur Leff, “A God-grounded system has no analogues. Either 
God exists or He does not, but if He does not, nothing and no one 
else can take His place.”67 
Nor, I submit, has any force in history exercised so beneficial 
an influence on public policy as Christianity. Christianity can be 
“known by its own fruit”68—fruit which warrants experimentally 
trying Christianity, “that by testing you may discern what is the 
will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect.”69 Even if I 
have not revealed anything in Christianity that is intriguing, 
however, I hope at least to have suggested the outline of a 
worldview which merits intellectual regard—one which is capable 
of speaking productively to public policy and which cannot, in all 
fairness, be barred from doing so. 
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